Comparing Oliver's "Pregnancy" and Waugh's "The Girl Who Made Us Think About Autonomy"

I don't know if we were supposed to make a new post or respond to our old ones, but...

In reviewing Kelly Oliver’s piece, we discussed the varying depictions of women and pregnancy in popular films. Though employing a “pro-choice” narrative, many of these films show women choosing to keep their babies and others suffering perilous fates if they do not. In “The Girl Who Made Us Think About Autonomy,” Joanne Waugh discusses the renowned Trilogy (The Girl Who…) and its complex character, Lisbeth Salander. Unlike the women discussed in Oliver’s piece, Lisbeth Salander is not a yearning mother. She is not even a warm or welcoming person. Suffered by the hands of men and authority, Salander lacks, what Waugh describes as, “the perspective of past and that of comfortable classes; she had neither a destiny prepared for her by a mother, childhood games, or adolescent fantasies about being in love, marrying, and having a baby or home” (145). This is best exemplified in her outward appearance. Described as looking like “an underdeveloped teenage girl” with piercings and tattoos, Salander’s physical appearance breeds no notions of “sexy” or “motherhood” (130). Because she does not exude the traditional categories of “woman” (mother, wife, etc.) and defies the gender roles expected of her, she becomes an open target to be violated by men. An excerpt from the book reads, “…by the time she was eighteen, Salander did not know a single girl who had not been forces to perform some sort of sexual act against her will…as a girl she was legal prey, especially if she was dressed in a worn black leather jacket and had pierced eyebrows, tattoos and zero social status” (134). Amongst Salander’s rape, torture and suffering, there is an implication that because she does not perform “womanhood” as socially accepted and expected, she must suffer a fate worse than death. This reads very similar to Oliver’s theory that women (and women of color) who do not live under society’s expectations of motherhood must suffer or die. This (again) brings into question why woman must be punished for nonconventional, untraditional or even autonomous actions.

(I look forward to talking more about this in class!)

Pregnancy: Choice and Excess

While I was familiar with many of the films Kelly Oliver referenced in "Pregnancy: Choice and Excess," her chapter made me think about and connect them in a new way. Additionally, while reading her chapter I kept thinking about the 2014 independent movie "Obvious Child," which tackles the topic of a young woman's "accidental pregnancy" from a one-night stand in a Juno-esque style of comedy, but the protagonist goes through with the abortion. This movie seems to be the exception from most teenage pregnancy movies that, as Oliver notes, "in the end, usually embrace conservative family values that endorse a woman's right to choose only if she chooses to have a baby" (69). I really loved the movie Obvious Child because (it is very funny) but also addresses the questions and challenges the young woman faces in making the choice to have an abortion in a contemporary way that is more relevant to most young people I know than movies such as Juno where the woman ends up having the baby. Unless a young woman is very religious, I would expect most college students would have an abortion if they became pregnant accidentally, and the fact that most movies do not represent this reality is problematic. One important point that Oliver makes in analyzing these films is the differences in representation between race and class. Oliver notes how in Juno and Saved!, "the teens' parents have surprisingly understanding and accepting, and tellingly unrealistic, reactions to their daughter's pregnancy" (63) - and this is also the case in Obvious Child, where the woman's mother is very calm when she finds out and even shares that she had an abortion herself. Consequently, her daughter's unplanned pregnancy strengthens their relationship. In contrast, in Precious, the mother is filled with rage. This difference in portrayal shows how unplanned pregnancies can have drastically different results depending on the teen's race and socioeconomic status. Middle-class white girls who get pregnant are portrayed as being thrown a curve-ball in life, but one that they will be able to handle and eventually have the support of their family. In contrast, an accidental pregnancy for a lower-class woman of color is represented as violent and disastrous. As Oliver notes, "this juxtaposition of beautiful happy educated middle class white girls and women having babies and abject violent uneducated black girls and women having babies works to reinforce latent racist eugenics notions" (62).

Pregnancy: Choice and Excess

What I liked most of the chapter we read was how the writer broached and discussed topics that many leave untouched due to their sensitive nature. I found all her discussions very interesting, but the one that drew me in the most addressed the issue of women and motherhood. As a woman in today's society, one can choose to have a successful career, or become a mother and have a family. Seldom do these two cleanly and successfully mix together. As Kelly Oliver states, "the dream of having it all becomes and exhausting schedule of soccer and dance lesson schedules, work, cooking, and cleaning, a schedule in which the demands of juggling career and family require high levels of caffeine and prescription drugs like Prozac (antidepressant) and Ambient (sleeping pill)." Though women have come a long way and now enter the work force, the fact that they have to choose between motherhood, a career, or an enjoyable life is absurd. Furthermore, this is a stance that only represents one side of the spectrum of female issues. As Oliver says, the 'solution' of extending fertility periods until post-monopoausal states are advertised to white, middle class women. The decision to have one or the other is no longer applicable, as the choice has expanded to include various others options. What remains, sadly, is the attitude that if women do not have children, due to their choice not to or some other reason, they are seen as unfulfilled, sad, deficient, or even abnormal. Usually, a woman who reaches the age of 50 without children has to make excuses like 'I wanted to focus on my career' or 'I don't get along with kids.' The fact that an explanation is needed is ludicrous. The opposite should also be true. A woman should not have to answer a question like 'Do you plan to start a family soon/ have children in the future?'

The fetal paradox and Excess

I found this reading to be very interesting, especially in regards to how the having a child, or an abortion, could be seen as excessive, real or imagined. When discussing the either/or mentality of having children for women, in which they either have a career or have a child but always one or the other, portrayed by cinema Oliver states, "By so doing, they attempt to domesticate the "accident" of pregnancy within the confines of traditional family values and thereby contain the imagined excess of pregnancy and pregnant bodies." (54) The description of pregnancy as an accident is one in which attaches to the idea that it is not wholly up to the woman if she gets pregnant. This being said the either/or way of looking at having children and the lifestyle it demands, as portrayed by Hollywood, makes the idea of having a child seem excessive, both in lifestyle and in future choices. This excess is also attributed to abortions in Hollywood, by making the focus of the mother and the fetus be at odds, even against, each other which Oliver calls the fetal paradox, in which the fetus and mother aren't viewed as other/within but either/or. The role of media and Hollywood in the depiction of pregnancy and abortion has created a set of norms that bring to the table a perceived excess with pregnancy.

Kelly Oliver's "Pregnancy: Choice and Excess"

Kelly Oliver’s “Pregnancy: Choice and Excess” examines different approaches to pregnancy in the media and movies, especially concerning women’s right to choose. This chapter exposed various stereotypes in movies with women having ‘accidental’ pregnancies and how they deal with them or women wanting to have babies, but struggling to do so. This chapter was very interesting, as I have seen a number of the movies and TV shows she discusses, but I’ve taken them at face, entertainment value. Among the many insightful points that Oliver makes, I found her discussion on fetal rights versus mother’s rights very topical. I think that as science has continually learned more about pregnancy and conception both the pro choice and pro life sides have had to update their stances, but pro life has definitely changed the most. It seems that they continually take more extreme positions, using ‘science’ and religion to back them up. Though science allows us a greater understanding of pregnancy and a visual of the child from the start through ultrasound, the Catholic Church and its positions on abortion have actually changed through time. It did not used to be such a grave sin to have an abortion, and for a time it was a great sin to have oral sex than an abortion. I believe that the growing legal battle between the fetus and its mother cannot be connected to religion, not only because that goes against the American belief of separating religion from government, but because the Church has constantly changed its stance and cannot claim historical evidence. The use of religious freedom by individuals, such as employers or healthcare workers, in denying women their personal freedoms is very concerning to me, especially considering the fact that these people in positions of power are projecting their beliefs on a being that belongs to the mother and her beliefs.

Kelly Oliver's Choice and Excess

Throughout Kelly Oliver’s chapter, I found myself in a whirlwind of emotions, specifically when talking about the “fetal paradox” and the discriminatory depiction of pregnant women of color. Last semester, I took a class in which we talked about how fetal rights vs. women’s rights are becoming a growing problem within hospitals. In the articles we read, (“No Less than Ravishment’: Forcing Medical Interventions on Pregnant Women” and “Behaving Badly: Punishing Women for Conduct during Pregnancy” (2000)), Rachel Roth examines the structural problems within our political and medical system which allow women to lose their rights to privacy and freedom of religion in hospitals. Roth recounts a laundry-list of instances in which mentally competent women have their choices trampled over by doctors and the courts in order to speak for the “third party” (often times the fetus or children a woman already has). Roth criticizes the current structure arguing “competent adult women lose jurisdiction over their bodies and are subjected to physical violation that is almost never otherwise perpetuated in civil society or in the criminal justice system” and “the fetus has been endowed with super-rights that exceed those of any living human being” (90 & 134). In reading Oliver’s article, I found it interesting that this is even depicted in movies where “the focus is on either the fetus/abortion OR the maternal body, but not both” (58). This is especially true with the growing use of the ultrasound which poses the fetus as an individual rather than apart from the female body.

In the section “Fertile Myrtle,” Oliver discuss the hypocrisy that comes with white teen pregnancy and women of color of pregnancy. While shows like Teen Mom and movies like Manny and Lo show happy circumstances for white women, movies like Precious show nothing but perilous circumstances and disparity. This praise vs. dire situations portrayed in movies show that Hollywood, which is often described as the ultimate liberal outlet for media, still practices and perpetuates the hypersexualized, uneducated and impoverished stereotypes that are imposed on women of color in the real world. 

The Fetal Paradox and Excess

Lynette Dixon 

I found Kelly Oliver’s discussion about the fetal paradox to be quite interesting. The fetal paradox can be found in representations of the fetus as separate from the maternal body, as at odds with it. Oliver contends that the paradox can be attributed to the emergence of ultrasounds that allows us to see the fetus thereby establishing the fetus as an autonomous other within the maternal body. Being viewed as the other within is what causes Hollywood to depict either the fetus or the mother, almost never both. I think that this paradox arises from the limits of subjectivity/ the limits of a subject under the law. There is a need for the subject to be autonomous so it is impossible to view both the fetus and the mother as one which is why debates on reproduction poses the rights of the fetus as separate from the rights of the mother. One is either pro-life in the interest of protecting the rights of the fetus, or pro-choice in the interest of the rights of the mother. But where is the middle ground? Do/can the rights of both the fetus and the mother converge?

Considering Dispossessions which proposes that we are undone by one another and thereby deconstructs the autonomous subject, it is easier to formulate an instance in which the mother does not have to be separate from the fetus. The paradox can be mediated when we consider the ways in which both the mother and the fetus are undone by each other. When we liberate ourselves from this concept of autonomy, there can be many more possibilities for being. In this case it would help expand reproductive dialogue to encompass the nuanced factors of reproductive choice that are not reduced to simplistic arguments about legal rights.

I also found the discussion of women’s reproduction as excessive interesting but I’m specifically interested in the reproduction of women of color to be more excessive.  Oliver sites movies that pose women of color as hyper fertile while white women struggle to get pregnant. What that leads to is white babies being viewed as precious gifts while babies of color are depicted simply as excess. Babies of color, specifically black babies, as seen from Precious, are the manifestation of excess. They represent/are the excess that is the black female. When considering Precious her appearance is the visual representation of  this excess and how such excess moves through society and is problematized by it. Her excess is multiplied through the birth of her children. I think that this is part of the reason that black youth face violence. Excess is disposable, excess is problematic, and society needs to be rid of excess. Where as that which is scarce is sacred and protected. 

Going back to my discussion of the fetal paradox, I think that the distinction between the mother and the fetus also comes from the fear of the female body in excess. 

Disidenitfying and the Erotic Politics of Laughter

Lynette Dixon 

“The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter” echoes the logic in Jose Munoz’s Disidentifications. While the Munoz text isn’t one that we read for this class specifically, the theory is integral to my final paper so it’s important that I connect the two. The process of disidentification entails taking the modes of representation that serve to oppress (stereotypes, institutions) and recycling them in performance in order to gain the ability to be able to renegotiate and redefine the terms of representation by the one who is being represented. This practice hinges upon the cultural material that is already used to represent a group. This is precisely the process that the Willets describe happen through comedic feminist discourse. Comedy, as a disidentificatory practice, works to subvert structures of power and ideas of motherhood and sexuality. “Borrowing from the shock value of the (allegedly) obscene,” allows for “illuminating the inversions and inflaming the passions that fuel social awareness and activism” (19) which necessary for political change. This is a practice that embraces powerlessness, as Young describes as a result of the exploitation of the marginalized that causes a lack of decision making, in order to redefine and reconstruct power dynamics so that at the end the whole concept of powerlessness itself has to be dismantled.  

This idea supports my claim that there must be a redefinition of political action that includes art, social media, etc. Furthermore I don’t believe there is such a thing as “art for art’s sake”,I think that politics and art are intimately linked. I think where we have perceived art to be apolitical is where we have failed to see the ways in which politics are being subverted.  Also, I think there is something to be said about this alternative political action as it is done through means that allows politics to be more accessible and yet easier to use to one’s advantage because it erases the lines between that which is political and what is not. 

Willetts': The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter

I really enjoyed this reading. Having grown up in the era of Tina Fey and Amy Poehler, and struggled with young adulthood with Lena Dunham and the women of “Broad City,” I am acutely aware of the importance of women in comedy and feminism. One point in “The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter” that really struck me was in discussing Wanda Sykes and her ability to point out social and political issues, her message is much more palatable because “she refuses moral or epistemic privilege to her standpoint”(31). Not taking a specific stance and acknowledging equality with everyone in terms of fault, Sykes makes these serious issues more approachable. I think a major part of comedy, and comedians, importance in addressing issues facing society is that it is observational and personal. Comedians do not tell people that they’re right, just lay out a situation with humor, and people can digest the message and come to conclusions on their own. These personal anecdotes are humorously framed, placing the responsibility of digesting the message and coming to conclusions to the audience.

The Seriously Erotic Politics of Feminist Laughter

This reading was very interesting. Cynthia and Julie Willett discuss the role of humor and how it affects social norms and political movements. Humor is something that can completely level the hierarchy of social norms through its appeal to irony and laughter. The importance of humor comes as one that, throughout history, has been crucial to that shaping of micro-norms in everyday life, some things society finds funny and others society does not. But the important thing is that humor can be exclusive to a certain group of people, shaping the way in which they think of themselves as beings in a realm of micro-norms and therefore changing the affects of these norms on them and others. Through humor the norms change and cognitive habits change with it, and by proxy so do political movements."Individuals regardless o f gender perpetuate these norms through practices that are often perceived as voluntary. Just as ridicule and humor provide an arsenal o f tools that can reinforce these norms and practices, so too this arsenal can tear those conventions down."

Cynthia & Julie Willett

I really enjoyed this week's reading, "The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter: Bitches, Whores, and Other Fumerists," because it addressed the role humor plays in fighting female oppression. The authors took a more tangible approach to discussing these issues, as opposed to Butler and Athanasiou's more theoretical conversations that we have been reading. The Willetts claims that they seek to analyze the feminism that "would shake up oppressive norms with a good and gutsy belly laugh" (19). While on the surface, female comedians doing stand up about motherhood and "detachable pussies" may not appear to fight oppression as overtly as a protest or policy-change, ultimately, humor is one of the most effective and comfortable ways to communicate the oppression women face that men may not be aware of. Feminist humor, or "fumerism" provides a pill men can swallow to begin to address their male privilege. While Wanda Sykes cannot convey the full scale of oppression women have to face throughout their lives simply because they are women, her "detachable pussy" routine communicates one instance of the oppression women face- the fear of not being able to run alone outside at night. I would expect that plenty of women find this routine comical because they can relate to the feelings and experience Sykes describes. I think the power in this comedy, however, lies in the men who experience "the moment of laughter [that] may jolt one out of habitual habits and cognition, and open up fresh posibilities" (25). There is always the possibility that ignorant men who laugh at this joke are not laughing at the absurdity of the situation, but actually laughing at women themselves. However, hopefully "fumerism" can provide that space for some men who otherwise have not grasped the oppression women face, to gain a glimpse of understanding through comedy, and in turn reflect on their position in society once the laughter has ceased.

"The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter" by Cynthia Willett and Julie Willett's

What struck me the most about this reading was the idea that feminist philosophy could be considered to be a lesser theory simply because it lacks universality. During the semester, we have discussed the obstacles to women face when attempting to organize a universal women's movement, and the fact that these obstacles can cause such a negative outlook on feminist theory and philosophy due to a lack of a "cohesive movement" seems absurd. What's more, it lacking the mainstream component gives people (men especially) cause to discard it hysterical and radical, encouraging women to adhere to ideals of motherhood, chastity, and serving/pleasing men. Yes, many obstacles exist within the feminist movement, but that does not mean it negates or invalidates its ideals and arguments. What I really loved about this piece is that is shows how women can adopt humor mixed with vulgarity to become something that does not fit the viewpoint men have of women, which leads them to shed their characterization of bodily pleasure for men. It allows women to create their own unique persona, invalidating the stereotype men place on women. Furthermore, when women shed this veil of purity and demonstrate a character similar to that of men, the action destroys any submissive illusion men may have while at the same time demonstrating that having universal feminist movement is naive. This is due to the diversity within the female population, one that mimics the one within the male population, putting everything into perspective and perfectly invalidating the immature view that the entire female population needs a united, feminist movement to equally represent all women.

Cynthia Willett and Julie Willett's "The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter"

I think The Seriously Erotic Politics of Laughter has to be, hands down, my favorite reading so far! In this piece, the Willetts discuss how feminist philosophy has been viewed as a lesser form of theory because of its lacks of universality and mainstream topics. Moreover, they explain that while men are seen as the humorists or comedians, it is feminist (or women in general) who are viewed as unfunny, told to maintain notions of Republican motherhood and chastity, and are merely reduced to “tits and ass.” In explaining the stereotypes and pressures of women, the Willetts flip the script and discuss the concept of “fumerist,” a term coined by writer Kate Clinton to describe a humor that is both “fuming” and “fun” and “captures the idea of being funny and wanting to burn the house down all at once” (19). Thus, it is comedians like Roseanne, Tina Fey, Margaret Cho and Wanda Sykes who understand the limitations of such stereotypes and discuss their problems in an open, clever way. The Willetts write, “…we argue that fumerist comedy can make visible the history of identity and the struggles for recognition and identification, but as a moment of dislocation and transformation. In other words, the moment of laughter may jolt one out of habitual habits and cognition, and open up fresh possibilities” (24).

Reflecting back on our previous readings, this piece reminded me not only of Butler and Athanasiou’s discussion of “biopolitics,” but also Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression” and the practice of “render[ing] the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” in cultural imperialism (Young, 59). I think, however, what drew me to this piece was its relevance to the phenomenon that is occurring in our television programs and movies today. Though we have had shows like Roseanne, more movies like Bridesmaids and television shows like The Mindy Project and Girls (a show that I have not seen, but have read much about) are now showing female comedians throwing these concepts of motherhood and female respectability out the window. There is a scene in Bridesmaids when Maya Rudolph’s character literally poops in a wedding dress in the middle of the street (after eating bad food for lunch). Though this scene could be viewed as vulgar, it is showing that women can be just as uncouth as the boys. Looking deeper into this scene, one could make the stretched argument that Maya Rudolph’s character is “shitting” on the ideas of proper decorum for women and marriage. Nevertheless, the age of “fumerists” are in full swing and I could not be happier! 

Chapter 17

Lynette Dixon 

Throughout this book, I have had the following questions: where the line between self and community exists, if there is a line at all, and if there even be a line? Chapter 17, Public Grievablity left me asking the same questions but I feel as if the answer to these questions lie in their discussion of the performing body. Butler states that performance makes it possible to articulate “a voice of the people from the singularity and the obduracy of the body, a voice at once individual and social’ another is the reproduction of community or sociality itself.” (175) Therefore in performance, the body no longer holds the same limitations, it is no longer tied to one self, and holds many more possibilities.

 I think I always understood that they were calling for a radical subjectivity and a radical body but I just didn’t know what that looked like. I think that it is the performative self/body that is the alternative. In performance, the obduracy of the body is manipulated so that a person can be both self and other. With this body it is possible for there both to be a line between the two and for there to be no line at all depending on the moment of performance. I think that it is because of this possibility that I could never quite pinpoint the answers to my questions. 

Chapter 17

 Though it was the shortest of the chapter within the book, i choose to focus on chapter 7 because i think it brings to light a very important topic: remembrance. How does one balance out remembering a tragedy a person or group of people were subjected to while still holding the person or group accountable for transgressions he/she/they might commit is a question that plagues both society ad politics. it is imperative that the horros a group went through never be forgotten, but it is also imperative that a group is not allowed to later commit similarily agrevious faults with no repercussions. The chapter recalled some instances in which protestors acknowledged past grievances committed against the groups committing some sort of violation. They then proceeded to point out that the past does not condone present faults with similarly peaceful demonstrations. To me, this is a topic that is not discussed enough as people are terrified of offending someone, being politically incorrect in some way, or overstepping their bounds. The fact of the matter is that the only factor that allows such an event to occur in a debate here there is respect and consideration for all the particpants is when the person or group who experienced the tragedy hide behind it to excuse, explain, or encourage their actions. Completely unacceptable, and yet, consistently seen in arguements throughout history. For example, the Christians in Bosnia blamed their violent rapes and massacres of the Bosnian Muslims on the previous killings and violence the Muslims enacted against them, over a generation earlier. in no way does this excuse their actions, and yet, that was their rationale. Memebers within the Christian armies who protested were shut down using this logic, which is not only an example of bullying and subjugation, but also of denying blame for an action. Chapter 7 struck deeply with me mostly because every horrific international tragedy had some sort of past event that political or military leaders used as an excuse to then pillage, rape, murder, and attempt to annihilate people. What both authors express here is, quie simply, that rememberence does not, and will never include, immunity. While rememberence of tragedy and reparations are important, especially for the prevention of further evil, in no way do they grant a group pf people or a single person any type of 'freebie' or leeway in evil actions.

Butler and Anthanasiou's "Public Grievability and the Politics of Memorialization" (Chpt. 17)

For our last reading of Butler and Athanasiou, their chapter (chapter 17) “Public Grievability and the Politics of Memorialization,” particularly stuck out at me. In an earlier chapter, Butler and Athanasiou discussed in the midst of wars and politics, who is considered “countable” or “worthy” of a number. This conversation continues with this idea of “memoro-politics.” Athanasiou writes: 

“Such re-membering engaged with the ways in which memoro-politics is produced through, and predicated upon, a constant contestation regarding what matters as memorable, who owns memory, and who or what is dispossessed of the rights and rites of memorability….The gesture of witnessing in the name of others (as in the title of the performance In the Name of), especially those constituted as alien to the forms and norms of memorable national belonging, acknowledges and, at the same time, displaces the norms that authorize collective memory through the proper name (of the father and the fatherland).”

In the midst of wars or racial disputes, discounting or dismantling others’ memories has been a weapon used to delegitimize opposing/other groups. Though it has been exercised throughout periods of history, it is not right. Who are we, as humans, to discount another person’s life? Or let injustice reign while people’s deaths go unnoticed? However, there is hope. As enter a phase of #BlackLivesMatter, I think people are starting to realize the importance of making names known and remembering the injustice that is surrounded in people’s deaths. Make no mistake, I do not believe all of our problems are solved with one mere hashtag or blurb, but I think it is starting to create a conversation surrounding the importance of life and creating proper memories for those who have died.  

Dispossession Chapter 20

In this chapter Butler discusses the ways in which education is becoming commercialized and how the humanities are suffering the most from this effect. This is interesting because it is occurring at Emory today, the direction the school seems to be going towards is more of a pre-professional route rather than a liberal arts focus. When the university cut journalism and education studies as well as others I wasn't yet a student here, but I heard quite a bit from those who went through the change, after reading this chapter in Dispossession I certainly have a new outlook on the decision and its implications for Emory. One of the points that Butler makes is to portray the value of critical thinking in a new and better way in order to keep up with the commercialization of higher education. This reminds me of The Epistemology of Ignorance by Tuana where she discusses a hierarchy of knowledge production that leads to the exclusion of certain peoples, I'm not sure if the cutting of programs qualifies as an example of the exclusion that Tuana discusses, but I'm sure that the ways in which the hierarchy of knowledge is moving is something that needs to be under close observation.

Butler and Athanasiou: Chapter 20

In chapter twenty, “The University, the humanities, and the book bloc” Butler and Athanasiou discuss how institutions of higher learning have become increasingly concerned about the institution’s commercial marketability, especially concerning concentrations that do not directly translate into jobs or are applicable to specific industries. Beyond the fact that certain majors are seen as not being lucrative, Butler states, “the basic rights and entitlements are also eroded within such a context, refashioned as ‘investments’ or as ‘disposable goods’”(190).  I think as humanities students at Emory we all can empathize and share in this sentiment. Most of us watched, and perhaps reacted, as the ‘Emory cuts’ were announced and implemented. When reading chapter I could imagine those events being recounted by Butler as the perfect example of how universities have become more interested in their marketability to the real world, as well as an example of political performativity through both the faculty and students’ responses. Bonnie Honig would applaud the coalition between faculty and students, who usually have different expectations and goals, but came together in the moment of crisis.

There were fiscal, quantifiable reasons given by the university for the cuts and new programs were announced that were deemed more relevant for the rapidly changing world, but to many students in the liberal arts, whether directly affected or not, it felt as though our own institution was publicly belittling us and our chosen fields of study. As someone who’s primary major was publicly demeaned and insulted by Obama, Emory’s movement against the liberal arts was not surprising but definitely alienating. Butler and Athanasiou focus on this conundrum of universities and society no longer finding an education of critical thinking important, and if that’s so, why pay the high price of admittance to these institutions when “one’s knowledge is unrecognizable by prevailing market standards?”(192).

Dispossession and Appropriation

Lynette Dixon

I find Butler and Athanasiou’s discussion about appropriation in Chapter 10 to be quite interesting. Athanasiou asks “if the vulnerability of the other calls upon our own susceptibility to previous and current violent modes of appropriation, how might we retain a responsive openness to the political and futures of alterity, as a prerequisite for the openness of political temporality and spatiality?”(116) Leading up to this question is a discussion about a shift from the I, the “ethnocentric, moralistic, and narcissistically unilateral narrative of trauma” to a third person view of struggle that is affected by the vulnerability of others as “I cannot conceive of my own struggle…without him or her”. This point worried me because I think about the ways in which the vulnerabilities of different groups are not matched so I don’t see how we can operate from this third person view. The vulnerability of those who are made to become dispossessed by systems of oppression is higher than those who are not.  So I’m back to the question I quoted originally, I don’t see how such a view escapes violent acts of appropriation as the vulnerability that comes along with becoming dispossessed is not a feeling that all groups have. I was not able to pinpoint an answer to this question in the reading.

 In thinking about appropriation, I thought back to the conversation we had earlier in the semester when Iggy Azalea came up. She has become the poster child for appropriation and I think that Athanasiou’s question can be applied here. Where do we draw the line between the interconnectednesss that comes with being dispossessed and appropriating culture or experiences?  Where/what are the lines between being in hip hop culture end and living hip hop or living in the conditions that lead to the emergence of hip-hop and  continues to inform it?  Are Butler and Astanasiou arguing that there are none/shouldn’t be any?

Dispossession CH 8-11

I was most intrigued by the concept of "counting" lives in this week's reading. Butler and Athanasiou discuss what it means for a life to matter- both in a bodily, material sense and more abstract, social sense. They also examine how systematic racism/oppression and the dispossession of individual lives factors into placing value on people's lives. Athanasiou argues that the value of a life is intrinsically political, as individuals involved in political struggles are in essence fighting for "the possibility of living (and not merely or barely surviving)" (99). The political struggles that prevail are those that people in positions of power have deemed as made up of people whose lives matter more, and are thus deserving of a higher quality of life. Butler counters this argument in addressing the issue of the "duality of number and significant" (100). When people speak about the tragedies in Gaza, how does the "value" of each life change depending on how many casualties there are? I think the duality of number and significance is a really important concept to grapple with. Large-scale casualties tend to get more focus in the media, which makes it seem as though the lives lost in these instances "count" more than individual lives lost in other effects of the war. On the flip side, when casualties are grouped together, this may discount the value of each individual life.

This chapter relates to Butler's previous writings in "Undoing." Butler introduces this chapter with asking, "who counts as the human... and whose lives count as lives... what makes for a grievable life?" (17-18). While in Disposession, Butler and Athanasiou focus on the lives of the deceased, in Undoing, Butler spends more time discussing the life of the grieving individual. Butler speaks to the idea that in the process of grieving, something about our own identity is revealed, and we change in some way. This concept made me think about how individual lives are valued based on lived experiences. Is an individual who has grieved, overcome tragedy, and gone through emotional hardships and identity transformation more "valuable" than someone who has lived an "easier" life with less self-searching and growth? Butler speaks to the value of a life in both of her pieces, and thinking about this concept in terms of both lives lost and living lives adds another dimension to her work.

Butler and Athanasiou 8-11

Chapter 10, responsiveness as responsibility, was very similar to Zerilli's idea and problem of making a political claim. The founding paradox in Zerilli is the idea that once you make a claim you create a foundation that may be excluding people from making more claims. This is akin to the idea in Butlers discussion that we are responsible for maintaining certain norms in society but also need to be aware that maintaining these things may lead to greater dispossession for others. A key example of this was discussed in class as the problem of feminism where some feminist were speaking for all women but were not represented by many women from  different races and cultures.

Butler and Athanasiou: 8-11

Continuing with Butler and Athanasiou’s discussion on dispossession, chapter nine: “Uncounted bodies, incalculable performativity” stuck out to me. Butler and Athanasiou discuss how “counting” people can either aid in maintaining the political or social norms of society by dictating who counts or can be used by those being dispossessed to demonstrate their rights and existence. Even when laws do not uphold the rights of everyone, the ability to be “countable” is exertable outside the confines of the law and does not need to be state-supported, as exhibited through their example of the human rights group Btselem, which published their calculation of Palestinian civilian casualties in the last war against Gaza and was subsequently charged with treason. This example brought to mind a situation that I was confronted with while working in Belfast, NI, where there was still a debate going on about what constituted a person being a ‘victim.’ With two extreme sides that still feel the effects of the conflict fighting over who is a victim or a perpetrator, many people who died during the almost thirty years of violence are lost to politics.

Judith Butler then states that “when bodies assemble without a clear set of demands, then we might conclude that the bodies are performing the demand to end conditions of induced precarity that are not livable”(102). This reminded me of Honig’s article “Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home,” where she advocates that people must leave the comfort of their ‘home’ and address the issues of society. Honig talks about confronting and challenging our differences and forming coalitions that are not natural or easy, which I think Butler is advocating for. The dispossessed don’t need to have specific goals or agree on exactly what they want, but they need to show unification, which Honig admits isn’t easy.

Butler and Anthanasiou's "Responsiveness as Responsibility"

In chapters 8-11 of Dispossession, Butler and Anthanasiou continue their dialogue of performativity through means of dispossession on the account of others, counting of lives, and responsibility of disspossession. This week, I was particularly drawn to the chapter, “Responsiveness as Responsibility.” Anthanasiou raises the question of who is culpable and how do we prosecute incidents of racist and sexist speech. To her question, Butler responds:

“Yes, we are in a quandary, since we cannot say, “Pay no attention to that racist act – focus instead on the structures of racism that make it possible”; we would then end up in a form of dualistic thinking, separating the structure from its instance. The fact that the structure requires its instance to repeat itself, which is why every racist regime requires its acts of racism, its racist speech, its daily forms of discrimination and exclusion. If we extract the structure from the everyday, then we have produced an “inverted” world in which what happens at the level of structure is more important than what happens at the level of the instance. The same thing happens, as you suggest above, when we only seize upon the instances, raging infinitely and recurrently against the instances without ever seeing the broader institutional and political structures at issue. This is why we have to understand structures as both temporal and spatial, since they have to renew themselves through their instances, where the instance is also always both a temporal and spatial matter. This is why the enraging instances have to be taken seriously, even if they cannot remain the ultimate or exclusive referent for political analysis and opposition.”

When reading Butler’s response, I immediately thought about the SAE scandal that has been plaguing our news for the past couple of weeks. There have been many who applaud the University of Oklahoma’s immediate response of shutting down the fraternity and expelling the two students who led the racist chant. However, sociologists and academics have argued that rather than focusing on culpability and expelling the students, this incident should have been the opportunity for greater introspection and change at the institutional level. This is something Butler argues in her response, saying that if we solely “seize” upon the instances, we will never see the broader structures at issue. With the rise of incidents of racial discrimination and violence, I agree with Butler’s argument in that instances and institutional structures should not be mutually exclusive, but rather we should take incidents, like the SAE scandal, seriously and use them as ways to bring greater systemic change.

Over spring break, I watched Alex Witt’s program and her discussion of the SAE incident. I think it is a good example for Butler’s argument: (Start at 4:40) http://www.msnbc.com/alex-witt/watch/fallout-continues-for-oklahoma-frat-413213763853

Butler and Athanasiou chapter 8-10

Chapter 8 through 10 greatly reminded me of the Lugones' piece on the oppression of women of color by white women. In chapter 9, the two philosophers center around a discussion of freedom of body and mind through the "politics of performativity."Athanasiou state that "in various forms of racism and land dispassion, we well as in neoliberal forms of governance through market assessments, social mattering emerges as an apparatus that regulates contemporary processes of making live and letting die (97). According to Lugones, in Western feminist theory, the voices of women of color are excluded in that they are addressed by enforcing marginalization, a social construct synonymous, I believe, with what Athanasiou is describing. When feminist theory is constructed, it is at the expense of non-Western middle class white women, explains Lugones. This is the process Athanasiou and Butler discuss and describe within these chapters. Another social construct that reminds me of these chapters is the Mohanty piece, where the main theme of the article reveals around the idea that oppressors know better than their victims, who, if "they knew better," would embrace what the oppressors are presenting before them. In almost every instance, this is also a social "mattering" where a culture places itself above another and labels itself superior to enact oppression and dominance by way of social escalation.

Butler and Athanasiou: Dispossession

Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou’s book “Dispossession: The Performative in the Political” explores dispossession through varied conversations that range from establishing a basic definition to discussing the modern economy. I found the conversational style very approachable, and their arguments were more understandable as they built upon and questioned one another’s points. Their early attempts to define and discuss dispossession result in two types of dispossession: the first, as I understood it, being under the control of an outside source that is “necessary,” such as government and law, while the second type pertains to “a condition painfully imposed by the normative and normalizing violence that determines the terms of subjectivity, survival, and livability”(2).  These definitions and further discussions around them remind me of the early reading “Five Faces of Oppression” by Iris Young, where she describes the five types of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Our “necessary” dependence on the government for rights puts us in a precarious position where we can easily be oppressed and dispossessed. Much of the discussion on “being” dispossessed and “becoming” dispossessed reminded me of the many small and subtle ways that people can be oppressed, as discussed by Young, and how it only takes one of the five types of oppression to be oppressed. While oppression and dispossession usually go hand in hand, I think the general consensus that if one type of oppression is present, then a person is oppressed, applies to dispossession, whether it is present for the start or an active process.

A lot of issues were covered by Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou in the first seven chapters of the reading. What stood out to me the most was the underlying implication that perhaps language is faulted in the description of differences by being to dualistic or deterministic. This is especially prevalent in the first chapters in which dispossession is defined as having a dual and paradoxical nature in that being disposed may be fundamental to identity as well as destructive for identity.

This aspect of dispossession seemed similar to the paradoxical nature of making political claims in Zerilli. When making a political claim one begins to speak for the entirety of the political collectivity for which one associates with. In this sense, the making of political claims is necessary for progress in a community but is also detrimental for those whose voices isn't heard by simply being associated with the claim of someone else.

"Dispossession: The Performative in the Political" CH 1-7

Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou's introduction of "dispossession" as a troubling concept holds true throughout the first half of their book. They define this concept in once sense as a condition of autonomy and in another sense as painful experiences of oppression and subjectivity. In both cases, dispossession is inherently relational and ultimately unavoidable in the social world. Butler and Athanasiou comment on the inescapable and paradoxical nature of dispossession with their claim that "we can only be dispossessed because we are already dispossessed" (5). Essentially, they claim that being dispossessed is a fact of life. One aspect of their concept of dispossession that I found intriguing was the explanation of dispossession as staying in one place. The authors draw on Rosa Parks in this example, and they also touch on Palestine as another example. I found this concept related to Honig's use of the idea of "home."

Honig defines home as “a place free of power, conflict, and place—an identity, a form of life, a group vision—unmarked or unriven by difference and untouched by the power brought to bear upon it by the identities that strive to ground themselves in its place” (258). The concept of dispossession seems to relate to Honig's idea that home must be challenged and interrogated in order to establish political engagement and democratic practices. In refusing to get up from her seat, Rosa Parks challenged the idea of "home" by sitting in a place she was not "supposed" to sit. This form of resistance was a crucial part of the Civil Rights movement that led to substantive change towards democratic practices. In a different context, many Palestinians believe in the "right to return home," and that they are currently living in exile. Related to the idea of dispossession, I wonder how the concept of "home" changes if it is not the safe space that Honig describes, but rather a place of the past and idealized place in the future. It seems that populations would have the autonomy being dispossessed creates at "home," but in both of these examples, Rosa Parks and Palestinians are seeking that autonomy by leaving home (staying on the bus/hoping to return to occupied land).

Dispossession and Undoing Gender

Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou present a lot of information in the first chapters but I am going to focus on the main definition of dispossession as it relates to the concept of grief that Butler presents in “Beside Oneself: On the Limits of Sexual Autonomy” . Butler and Athanasiou distinguish between two types of dispossession in which one can either be dispossessed or can become dispossessed.  Athanasiou states that being dispossessed means that “the subject comes to exist by installing within itself lost objects along with the social norms that regulate the subject’s disposition to the address of the other.”(2)  Butler adds to this by asserting that “we are dispossessed of ourselves by virtue of some kind of contact with another.” In this definition of dispossession, a subject is can only defined as such because of the dependency and relationships they have with the other and with culture. From my understanding, in this form identity is formed in relation to what it is not, by what it lacks. Becoming dispossessed, on the other hand, happens when a subject has normative culture and values imposed on them in a way that renegotiates the terms of their subjectivity. This form of dispossession describes the process in which one is violently relegated to the sphere of the other.

In the chapter we read in Undoing Gender, she talks about mourning and what this process proves about the dependency of subjectivity. She states that while grief is temporary, “something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to others, that shows us that those ties constitute a sense of self, compose who we are…”(18) Butler calls this the process of being undone by another but she also explicates that grief should be understood as one of the modes of dispossession. She states that the self that relies on relationality does not replace the autonomous self but rather explains the rupture between self and other that it the crux of identity itself. I think this is the same point that is being made in the book. 

Chapters 1-7

Athanasiou's discussion of having vs. not having in relation to having or not having a phallus. Butler and Athanasiou go on in the chapter to address lines of division within a group made up of females and males. Mostly, this reminded me of the division that occurs in Mackinnon's article. On the first day, according to page 87 of her article, dominance is achieved by a group. In the second day, the dominant group provides a division, or a structured having vs. not having system where the group that lacks the "having" is the submissive. The discussion Athanasiou and Butler have in chapter 4                          reminds me of these stages.
Chapter six of the book reminded me greatly of Young' fives faces of oppression and Tuana's taxonomy of the epistemology of ignorance. The line "when the 'self' who struggles for recognition and self-recognition has been violently mis-recognized, constituted as radically or uncannily unfamiliar by a recognizable self-same human," is reminiscent of four of Young's faces of oppression (65-66). In this, we see violence, powerlessness, imperialism, and marginalization of the smaller group. By this same logic, we can see how Tuana's epistemology of ignorance is then tied into the faces of oppression.

"Sexual Dispossessions" and "Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination"

In reading Butler and Athananasiou’s Dispossession: The Performative in the Political, I was captured by their style in which they used to explain and analyze philosophical and political issues. Though we have read collaboration pieces written by two theorists (e.g. Lugones and Spelman’s “Have We Got a Theory for You!) Butler and Athananasiou’s work read more like a conversation, where two colleagues went back and forth discussing the political issues at hand. Though many times Butler and Athananasiou were in agreement, they often questioned and challenged each other’s language and concepts, making the reading more engaging.

While these first seven chapters discussed many of the concepts we have discussed previously, I was very interested in their chapter “Sexual Dispossessions.” This idea of regulatory versus constitutive means of power when discussing sex and gender made me reflect on Catherine MacKinnon’s “Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination.” In her piece, MacKinnon argued that measuring women in accordance with man transformed sex into a “bipolarity” rather than a continuum, thus identifying women always as “the other” (MacKinnon). Similarly, Athananasiou and Butler discuss the complexities that come with “biopolitics” and sexual orientation. While Athananasiou argues that possession of a phallus strengthens masculine-feminine binary of power, Butler takes a step further from MacKinnon and Athananasiou’s ideas and argues that variances of sexuality and individual choice make the normative concept of “biopolitics” now ambivalent. Butler and Anthananasiou later enter a dialogue in which both talk about the problems of “sexual orientation” and how it must be released from the “hegemonic heteronormative” it cannot seem to escape. 

Difference and its ineradicability

Honig sees difference as something that is inherent and a part of the human condition. The problem of difference is that people attempt to flee from it. The ways in which this is done, according to Honig, occur through purely utilitarian ethics which, "... treats agents as point in the line of a satisfaction system, it obligates them to preform even very unpalatable actions if those actions are necessary to produce utilitarianly preferred outcomes." (Honig 263), and through adhering purely to ones integrity which, "consists in her being the sort of person who refuses to or is unable to dissociate herself from her emotions, feelings, principles, or projects even for the sake of a larger or more general good." (Honig 263) the reason that these two ways of dealing with ethical questions are flights from difference and dilemmas is because they are done as though it is outside oneself. From a standpoint that ignores the differences of the people involved. Honig suggests that the way to combat this is to work in coalition, among people with differences, and to realize that the comforts of home are imaginative projections of a life that cannot be and that we should be honest of the reality that the foundations on which we base this imagination of home may in fact be at the cost of the freedom of others. So then, through facing the reality of difference and working in coalition people will become de-centered and be more democratically inclined to change the institutions that ignore difference.

Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home

Bonnie Honig states that difference is “a problem for identity, not one of its adjectives” (258).  Honig wants ‘difference’ to become a more complex political term that encompasses, not only the surface identity of citizens only confirming their diversity, but also “the inescapability of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the political and moral projects of ordering subjects, institutions, and values” (258).  Democratic theory is no longer only responsible for finding and identifying the proper ways to organize people in successful democratic societies, but must respond to the vibrant changes and conflicts in modern society and redefine how political structures should handle and evolve with the changes. Honig states that democratic theory has previously allowed for the private realm of the home, which is free from the conflicts of politics and difference, allowing for a secure identity. Difference does not allow for a retreat from conflict or an identity outside of society, but requires each person to view themselves in relation to others and what is going on around them. Democratic theory should respond to this by requiring participation, as people’s identities are no longer disengaged from society.   

Bonnie Honig, "Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home"

Honig thinks about the challenges of difference to democratic practice and theory in terms of the concept of dilemmatic spaces. In this view, dilemmas are when the underlying differences that are always present in society reveal themselves, rather than being circumstantial challenges that occur. Honig conceptualizes differences as not just a descriptor in group identities, but the very integral core of an individual's identity. Therefore, the dilemmas that transpire due to differences can transcend government and politics and, Honig argues, serve as "a site from which to interrogate... the cultural constructs that support and stabilize conventional gender differences [and] value pluralism" (260). Ultimately, Honig claims decentered subjects working in social democracies is the ideal government format to deeply engage with and interrogate these differences. Honig claims social democracies are an ideal forum for these decentered subjects because they provide "the greatest potential to permit and even energize the sorts of mobilities and settlements these renegotiations [of difference] require" (273). In democratic practice, social democracies are a space that encourages challenging differences and transforming society for new generations. When decentered subjects occupy these democracies, they are successful in examining differences because they are both plural themselves and acutely aware of the major role that differences play in identities and dilemmas. They can, therefore, tackle these differences with a realistic worldview. This means they will utilize their in depth understanding of dilemmas and differences as integral to identity in order to "energize their social democracies" to renegotiate the meaning of justice.

Honig and Difference

Honig begins his article by outlining the difference between his definition of “difference,” stating how the past definition presents difference as “nothing more than [something that] identities different from ‘ours,’” an idea synonymous with pluralism. Honig explains that the definition of “difference,” the one he uses and supports, evolved to include a difference in identity, focusing on how this identity is formed and the concept of “that which resists or exceeds the closure of identity.” Unlike the past definition where difference was in fact a difference from others, this definition took on an approach where the difference stemmed from within. One of the major challenges of difference to democratic theory and practice is the adherence to the previous definition, from which division and segregation stem. As Honig states, “difference as simply a different identity enables them to affirm a diversity that is potentially unruly but is also reassuring insofar as it does not threaten to be ungovernable;” this is exactly what the true threat is. This diversity originates from a perceived division that, according to the past definition of difference, stems from the difference in identity. This is misconceived and allows for the development of the idea of the ‘other’ from which the hurtful and prejudicial side of ‘difference’ develops. An identity that stems from within impedes outward difference, as in, difference that is perceived based upon a physical or visual variance. Any type of difference that can be identified or labeled by an outside party, as the first definition practically defines, allows for a division to be made from the outside instead of from the inside. Division from the inside does not mean more segregation, but individuality, a concept the second definition promotes and encourages. Individuality allows democracy to prosper, while division based upon an outward difference promotes segregation and inequality.

            It is from this first definition that Honig suggests that the other threats of difference, such as ungovernability, stem. Though Honig goes to outline various other issues difference confronts democratic theory and practice with, I believe the one he opens and details in the first part of his article is the most important.

Honig's Concept of Difference in Democratic Practice (Post #7)

Using Bernard Williams’s analysis and examples of ordinary and radial dilemma and pluralism, Honig takes a critical step further in explaining the concept of home and its application when facing difference in democratic practice. Honig argues that people have an idealistic concept of home, “a place free of power, conflict, and place—an identity, a form of life, a group vision—unmarked or unriven by difference and untouched by the power brought to bear upon it by the identities that strive to ground themselves in its place” (258). Often compared to a mother’s womb, home is a conceptual place where our internal beliefs and integrity take precedent. As a result, we forever yearn home and have an internal instinct to preserve it. However, Honig recognizes this concept of home brings a plethora of issues. First, Honig argues (citing Bernice Reagon’s “Coalition Politics”) that home, a place with no conflict or difference, does not mirror the real world, a place filled with “Others” (people differing from us ideologically, racially, emotionally, and psychologically). Rather, it leaves certain people confined to a place a privilege, while “Others” are repelled and dismissed. Additionally, Honig recognizes that this desire to maintain the home and keep it away from conflict leaves people with two options—withdrawal (“to a supposedly safe home that is elsewhere, away from the all this tumult”) or conquer (“of that tumultuous disorder in order to build a supposedly safe home here.”) (270). For this reason, Honig describes home as “dangerous” and “engag[ing] zealotry” (Ibid). Consequently, she, in addition to feminist theorists Teresa de Lauretis and Bernice Reagon, believe that in order to establish democratic empowerment the concept of home must be challenged and interrogated. They argue this is the only way difference and dilemmas bring social democratic struggle.